**Baudrillard Labour K**

**The AC ensures a “living wage” but they destroy life in the process. Laborers are confined within the the parasitic ransom of slow death. This embodies the relationship between the laborer and labour that makes death a privilege and reifies a master slave dialectic. Baudrillard 93:**

Jean Baudrillard “Symbolic Exchange and Death”. Translated by Iain Grant. 1993. http://insomnia.ac/essays/labour\_and\_death/

**Labour power is instituted on death. A man must die to become labour power. He converts this death into a wage. But the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on him by his definition as a productive force.** Faking this equivalence is nothing next to the equivalence, *qua* signs, of wages and death. The very possibility of quantitative equivalence presupposes death. The equivalence of wages and labour power presupposes the death of the worker, while that of any commodity and any other presupposes the symbolic extermination of objects. Death makes the calculation of equivalence, and regulation by indifference, possible in general. **This death is not violent and physical, it is the indifferent consumption of life and death, the mutual neutralisation of life and death in survival, or death *deferred*.** Labour is slow death. This is generally understood in the sense of physical exhaustion. But it must be understood in another sense. Labour is not opposed, like a sort of death, to the "fulfilment of life", which is the idealist view; labour is opposed *as a slow death* to a violent death. That is the symbolic reality. **Labour is opposed as deferred death to the immediate death of sacrifice.** Against every pious and "revolutionary" view of the "labour (or culture) is the opposite of life" type, we must maintain that the only alternative to labour is not free time, or non-labour, it is sacrifice. All **this becomes clear in the genealogy of the slave. First**, **the prisoner** of war **is** purely and simply **put to death** (**one does him honour in this way**). **Then he is "*spared*"** [*épargné*] **and *conserved*** [*conservé*] (=*servus*), **under the category of** spoils of war and a prestige **good: he becomes a slave** and passes into sumptuary domesticity. It is only later that he passes into servile labour. However, he is no longer a "labourer", since labour only appears in the phase of the serf or the *emancipated* slave, finally relieved of the mortgage of being put to death. Why is he freed? Precisely in order to work.

**The master always draws his power from this suspension of death, control over the only foreseeable end in life is how master figures always keep slave figures in submission and in constant fear - this drains all value to life. Baudrillard 2:**

The substance of labour and exploitation is indifferent in this symbolic relation. **The power of the master always** primarily **derives from this suspension of death**. **Power is therefore never**, contrary to what we might imagine, **the power of putting to death**, but exactly the opposite, **that of allowing to live -- a life that the slave lacks the power to give.** The master confiscates the death of the other while retaining the right to risk his own. The slave is refused this, and is condemned to a life without return, and therefore without possible expiation. **By removing death, the master removes the slave from the circulation of symbolic goods. This is the violence the master does to the slave, condemning him to labour power.** There lies the secret of power (in the dialectic of the master and the slave, Hegel also derives the domination of the master from the deferred threat of death hanging over the slave). Labour, production and exploitation would only be one of the possible avatars of this power structure, which is a structure of death.

**Imposing life is fascist – the affs denies the right to death, and instead ontologically enslaves laborers. Baudrillard 3** (Jean, “Carnival and Cannibal”, pg. 63-70)

There is no difference between the ‘free market’ Yes and the European ‘social’ No. This is why the No, which is merely a No to a particular kind of Europe, isn’t really a No – **the only No that genuinely constitutes an event is this strange, non-political, non-dialectical, elusive No, since it runs counter to enlightened self-interest. It is a No that isn’t the opposite of a Yes (the No of the things that can exist without their opposites), but might be said to be closer to a silent rejection of the kind that makes Bartleby say, ‘I would prefer not to!’** I am not playing the game! (But without aspiring to provide a reason.)” You have to be able to fight everything that wishes to do Good to you. Against the Axis of Good: the parallax of Evil. Gilmore (The Executioner’s Song) and his refusal of a pardon. Bartleby and his tenacious rejection. Those who vote No to Divine Europe. The immigrants who burn their schools. They are all fighting against that which wishes to do them good. **This is what Gilmore does in The Executioner’s Song** and it is what makes this mundane story of a condemned man funny and paradoxical. He fights – **he is forced to fight – against his staunchest defenders (those who refuse to let him be executed in the name of the absolute principle of the right to life, a principle which does, however, show itself for what it is: the moral obligation to live at all costs,** the categorical imperative to exist, that principle in whose name they hanged suicides, dead or alive, in the Middle Ages**). It is against this ultimatum that Gilmore rebels – not that he is in favour of the death penalty, but he is equally opposed to the injunction that he must live, opposed to that institutional ‘human right’, against which he sets another – unconditional human right: the right to die.** He thereby transcends his own crime and any idea of punishment and transforms his particular case into a metaphysical duel with the forces of Good. The very people who want to save him (despite himself) come to detest him for having demanded to die. **This is quite a fetching contradiction of the whole system of moral values** – and the fact is that, at bottom**, condemning someone to death and condemning them to life ‘on principle’ involves the same kind of legal violence. And it must be rejected in every case, even when** – especially when – **the desire is to ‘do you good’.** Gilmore doesn’t at all think he ‘deserves’ to die, nor does he think he must allow his life to be taken to expiate his crime. Having been condemned to death, he simply demands that the authorities face up to the sentence, as he is prepared to do. He thereby shows how every sentence is a double edged sword and that it can be returned to the sender. **It is a challenge which the price to be paid is his own death, but what is at stake is making the whole of a society lose face when that society, in its arrogance, reserves the right to grant him mercy against his own will (putting in play their own deaths, not suicidally but as a weapon of defiance, is also the terrorists’ strategy). If he wins out in this duel, then admittedly, he loses his life, but he recovers a glorious image of himself – far from the paths of pardon and repentance which he despises.** It is a bit like the Student of Prague who dies when he shoots the mirror from which his image has been stolen, but re-finds himself in the fragments of the mirror of the moment of his death. It is like the woman in the coma who was given a life-sentence of life – it is forbidden to unplug her. Gilmore wants to be unplugged. **At issue here,** as ever, **is the gift. The gift you reject because it is inflicted on you unilaterally – which amounts to a humiliation and a symbolic dispossession. We can see this clearly in the rage of those who defend existence at any price, the same rage as shown by the advocates of the Yes against the No. The extraordinary, misplaced anger of the well-wishing against those who reject their overtures.** It is the anger of the people of God (of Divine Europe), of those who have universal right no their side and hence the right to exterminate the apostates. This hatred on the part of the disappointed of conquering Good and hegemonic Reason is much fiercer than the hatred felt by the dispossessed, by those who have things taken from them, who are exploited and whose material means of life are snatched away from them. **They have no other outlet than a liberatory violence, a violence of protest and demands. Quite different is the violence of those whom one gives, to whom one gives forcibly, or whose lives one spares. They have only symbolic revenge left to them. Now**, for want of anything better, **this revenge crystallizes in the unconditional withdrawal from the social order, from the planetary order, from the conventional order, from the advantages of reason**. This is why the case of Gilmore, who wants to be killed – to be unplugged – who rejects any leniency on the part of the law, which would cause him to lose face, is the reflection today of a universal situation and a universal challenge: a challenge to the ascendancy of all the networks, to that enframing by all the blessings of reason, Technology and Science. Must we accept this unconditional conditioning or not? We are all reduced today to saving the little bit of singularity, the little bit of symbolic space and territory left to us, against a global machinery, a global enterprise of Doing-Good, which demands of us the sacrifice of any will and intellect (this is still the pact that was proposed by Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: wellbeing and servitude)/ And where might this ‘left-field’ energy come from? From that impenetrable zone there is in every individual; from that ‘heart’ that is resistant to the injunction of all the apparatuses, of all the machinery of rationalization. It is all this that is in play in Gilmore’s fantastic defense.

**The only alternative is the radically violent action that calls the Master figure ideology into question. Strip the master of labour power by rejecting the 1AC’s Master ideology. Only this act of destabilization can reclaim the right to death. Baudrillard 4:**

This changes every revolutionary perspective on the abolition of power. **If power is death *deferred*, it will not be removed insofar as the *suspension* of this death will not be removed.** And if power, of which this is always and everywhere the definition, resides in the act of giving without being given, it is clear that the power the master has to unilaterally grant life will only be abolished if this life can be given to him -- *in a non-deferred death*. **There is no other alternative; you will never abolish this power by staying alive, since there will have been no reversal of what has been given. Only the surrender of this life, retaliating against a deferred death with an immediate death, constitutes a radical response, and the only possibility of abolishing power.** No revolutionary strategy can begin without the slave putting his own death back at stake, since this is what the master puts off in the *différance* from which he profits by securing his power. Refuse to be put to death, refuse to live in the mortal reprieve of power, refuse the duty of this life and never be quits with living, in effect be under obligation to settle this long-term credit through the slow death of labour, since this slow death does not alter the future of this abject dimension, in the fatality of power. **Violent death changes everything**, slow death changes nothing, for there is a rhythm, a scansion necessary to symbolic exchange: something has to be given in the same movement and following the same rhythm, otherwise there is no reciprocity and it is quite simply not given. **The strategy of the system of power is to *displace* the time of the exchange,** substituting continuity and mortal linearity **for the immediate retaliation of death.** It is thus futile for the slave (the worker) to give little by little, in infinitesimal doses, to the rope of labour on which he is hung to death, to give his life to the master or to capital, for this "sacrifice" in small doses is no longer a sacrifice -- it doesn't touch the most important thing, the *différance* of death, and merely distils a process whose structure remains the same.

#### The role of the ballot is to reject oppressive ideology in systems of knowledge like debate. When we don’t reject oppressive norms starting here it is game over outside of the round. Foucault 97:

Foucault (Michel, Prof @ College de France ,“What Is Critique?” from The Politics of Truth (1997), lecture given in May 1978, p. 59-61

What I understand by the procedure of eventualization, whilst historians cry out in grief, would be the following: first, one takes groups of elements where, in a totally empirical and temporary way, **connections between** mechanisms of **coercion and** contents of **knowledge can be identified**. Mechanisms of different types of coercion, may be also legislative elements, rules, material set-ups, authoritative phenomena, etc. One would also **consider** the contents of **knowledge** in terms of their diversity and heterogeneity, view them **in the context of** the effects of **power** they generate inasmuch as they are **validated by their belonging to a system of knowledge**. We are therefore not attempting to find out what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive. What **[W]e are trying to find** out is what are the links, what are **the connections** that can be identified **between** mechanisms of **coercion and** elements of **knowledge**, what is the interplay of relay and support developed between them, **such that** a given element of **knowledge takes on the effects of power** in a given system where it is allocated to a true, probable, uncertain or false element, **such that** a procedure of **coercion acquires** the very form and **justifications** of a rational, calculated, technically efficient element, etc. Therefore, on this first level, there is no case made here for the attribution of legitimacy, no assigning points of error and illusion. And this is why, at this level, it seems to me that one can use two words whose function is not to designate entities, powers (puissances) or something like transcendentals, but rather to perform a systematic reduction of value for the domains to which they refer, let us say, a neutralization concerning the effects of legitimacy and an elucidation of what makes them at some point acceptable and in fact, had them accepted. Hence, the use of the word **knowledge** (savoir) that refers to all procedures and all effects of knowledge (connaissance) which are acceptable at a given point in time and in a specific domain; **and** secondly, the term **power** (pouvoir) which merely covers a whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely to induce behaviors or discourses. We see right away that these two terms **only have a methodological function**. It is not a matter of identifying general principles of reality through them, but of somehow pinpointing the analytical front, the type of element that must be pertinent for the analysis. **It is** furthermore **a matter of preventing** the perspective of **legitimation** **from coming into play as it does when the terms knowledge** (connaissance) **or domination are used**. It is also important at every stage in the analysis, to be able to give knowledge and power a precise and determined content: such and such an element of knowledge, such and such a mechanism of power. No one should ever think that there exists one knowledge or one power, or worse, knowledge or power which would operate in and of themselves.